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Chapter 1
Introduction
Using nuclear power always includes a risk of a radioactive release. All the risks are to
be minimized so that the benefits of the nuclear power are greater than the unwanted
consequences to the society. This thinking is based on the so called principle of justi-
fication from the Radiation Act [1]. In case there would be a nuclear or radiological
emergency, there has to be an emergency plan according to Finnish Emergency Powers
Act [2] and Rescue Act [3]. To define proper protective actions and to prepare for emer-
gency situations, authorities require a proper analysis on possible threats and their
effects on environment and people. In Finland, Radiation and Nuclear Safety Au-
thority (STUK) is the competent authority on nuclear and radiological emergencies,
which provides expertise and recommendations to rescue services and governmental
authorities which have the decision making power on protective actions considering
the population and the society in general.
1.1 Objective
The objective of this master’s thesis is to offer material to STUK’s work on prepared-
ness regarding nuclear power plant (NPP) accidents. Nuclear power plant accidents
are impossible to predict accurately. It is difficult to predict dispersion of the possi-
ble radioactive release due to inaccuracies of the weather forecast models and overall
nature of weather conditions as well as due to uncertainty of the release time and
duration.
1.2 Previous research
Previous report on nuclear power plant threats considering Finland was made in 1993
about the risks of the Sosnovyy Bor nuclear power plant in Leningrad, Russia [4].
Report was published by Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Security Authority STUK
in collaboration with Finnish Meteorological Institute. The scope of the report was
short term radiological consequences in Southern-Finland in case of a hypothetical se-
vere reactor accident. In 1994 Technical Research Center of Finland VTT published a
report as well on Sosnovyy Bor [5]. The topic of the report was radiation risks consid-
ering the NPP.
1
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In 2011 STUK published an update considering the report published in 1993 [6].
The report update includes five other NPP locations amongst Sosnovyy Bor: Loviisa
and Olkiluoto in Finland, Kola in Russia, Ingnalina in Lithuania, and Forsmark in
Sweden.
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) published a Review of Swedish emer-
gency planning zones and distances in 2018 [7]. In the review SSM studied postulated
nuclear events on their NPPs at Forsmark, Oskarshamn, and Ringhals. SSM made
suggestions to change emergency planning zones (EPZs) so that the precautionary ac-
tion zone (PAZ) would be an area with 5 km radius from the NPP and urgent protective
action planning zone (UPZ) would have 25 km radius.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
This thesis is structured so that the chapter 2 introduces different types of ionizing
radiation and their biological effects. In chapter 3 the basics of nuclear reactors and
radioactive materials in them are presented within the scope of this thesis. Chapter 3
presents also the dispersion and deposition of radioactive materials. Chapter 4 intro-
duces the preparedness for a nuclear emergency and protective actions during a NPP
accident in Finland.
Chapters 5-6 presents the methods used in data analysis. Chapter 5 describes how
the modeling of the weather, and dispersion and dose calculations were executed. In
chapter 6 the accident scenarios and the source terms used in them are introduced. In
chapter 7 the post-processing methods of the calculated data are introduced.
In chapter 8 the results are shown and discussed. Comparison to current protec-
tive action operational intervention level values and NPP EPZs are made. Chapter 9
concludes the results and discusses the future research prospects. The 10th and final
chapter summarizes the topics and results of this thesis.
Chapter 2
Ionizing radiation
Ionizing radiation is highly energetic and able to change the electric charge of atoms
i.e. ionize them. This radiation originates from radioactive decay, nuclear reactions,
or from the activity at the atom’s electron sheath. When energy of ionizing radiation is
absorbed by human tissue, it causes chemical changes and has negative biological con-
sequences [8]. Ionizing radiation is divided into electromagnetic radiation as gamma
and X-rays, and particle radiation as alpha and beta rays, and neutron radiation.
This chapter introduces the properties of ionizing radiation – beginning with ra-
dioactive decay in section 2.1. In section 2.2 the units of measure considering radia-
tion, and relevant to this thesis, are introduced. Section 2.3 discusses the effects of the
radiation on humans and environment, stating the reasons why protective actions are
in place in case of a radioactive release. How these radioactive materials disperse and
deposit is the basis on these protective actions. These are discussed in section 3.4.
2.1 Radioactive decay
There are some nuclei in nature that are unstable, which means they spontaneously
alternate into other nuclei without any external triggers [8]. An aspect effecting to
the stability is neutron-proton ratio of the nucleus. When the number of protons in-
creases over 83, the electromagnetic forces on the positive particles create a repul-
sion that makes the stability of the nucleus impossible [9]. This means that elements
with atomic number Z ≥ 84 are not stable and hence are called radioactive elements.
These elements emit energy to reach a more stable configuration [10]. Another way
to express stability properties is by binding energy of the nucleus. Binding energy Q
describes how much energy is needed to separate the nucleons of a certain nucleus.
The ratio between Q and mass number A tells how stable the nucleus is. When Q/A
is large, the nucleus is stable [11]. Figure 2.1 illustrates this ratio, and shows how
the mid-mass and heavy nuclei has the highest ratio. Iron-56 (56Fe) has the highest
energy per nucleon – approximately 8.6 MeV.
The decay process is called radioactive decay. The decaying nucleus is called parent
nucleus and the resulting nucleus the daughter nucleus. In the decay process the
parent nucleus emits particles and/or photons.
Figure 2.2 shows the schematic illustrations of basic radioactive decay processes:
alpha decay, beta decay, and gamma decay. These are introduced in more detail in
sections 2.1.1-2.1.3.
3
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FIGURE 2.1: Binding energy per nucleon as a function of mass number A [12].
2.1.1 Alpha decay
Alpha decay occurs on heavy nuclides that are unstable. Those nuclides emit a nucleus
of an ionized helium-4 atom, 42He [11]. The daughter nuclide might be in an excited
state and emits electromagnetic radiation when returning to ground state. Each alpha
active nuclide emits alpha nuclides at the same energy or the energies are divided to
a few different energy groups.
The alpha decay induced radiation is densely ionizing [11]. Alpha particle loses its
kinetic energy in inelastic collisions [8]. It has mass of over 7000 electrons, so it goes
straight forward in the medium without scattering. Due to alpha particle’s high mass
and charge, a medium is able to decelerate α-particle effectively. Hence the range of
an alpha particle is short. For example in the air, the range R (in centimeters) of an
α-particle with energy E (in MeV) can be estimated under normal temperature and
pressure with formula [8]
Rair = 0.56 ·E, when E < 4 MeV
Rair = 1.24 ·E−2.62, when 4 MeV<E < 8 MeV. (2.1)
If the medium is other than air, the range is expressed in area-mass units (in mg/cm2)
is
Rρ = 0.56A1/3r Rair, (2.2)
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FIGURE 2.2: Schematics of basic radioactive decay processes, where 42He refers to
alpha particle, ν to neutrino and ν¯ to antineutrino, e− to electron and e+ to positron,
and γ to gamma ray.
where A1/3r is relative atomic mass of the medium.
These equations show how the α-radiation acts in different media. In air the range
of 6 MeV alpha particle is approximately 4.6 cm and in tissue it is 56 µm.
2.1.2 Beta decay
In the beta decay the nucleus returns to the lower energy state so that the charge of
the nucleus changes but the mass number does not [8]. Beta decay can be divided into
three categories: β+ and β− decay, and electron capture.
Beta decay occurs when one neutron in a nucleus decays into proton and electron
(β−-decay) or one proton decays into neutron and positron (β+-decay) [8]. The actual
radiation is when the electron or the positron is emitted from the nucleus in the de-
cay process. In addition, the electron (or the positron) annihilates with positron (or
electron). In annihilation two gamma quanta are emitted. In the electron capture
(EC) nucleus literally captures an electron from the electron sheath. An electron from
upper electron shell fills the void left by the captured electron, causing characteristic
X-ray radiation.
Since electrons and positrons, β−- and β+-particles, are much lighter than alpha
particles, they behave in a different matter in medium. The beta particles are sensitive
to inelastic scattering, hence they lose their energy quickly and their trajectories are
CHAPTER 2. IONIZING RADIATION 6
curvy and irregular.
The range of beta radiation is expressed in area-mass units as well. With maxi-
mum energy E the estimate for range is [8]:
Rρ =
{
0.412E1.254−lnE, when 0.01 MeV ≤E ≤ 2.5 MeV
0.53E−0.106, when E > 2.5 MeV and Rρ > 1.2 g cm−2 (2.3)
2.1.3 Gamma radiation
Gamma radiation is a general expression for electromagnetic radiation induced by the
changes in the energy state of a nucleus or nuclear transitions. The energy of a gamma
quantum Eγ is the remainder of the energy of the exited state (E1) and final energy
state (E2). The frequency f and wavelength λ can be calculated from that energy as
well [8]:
Eγ =E1−E2 = hf = hc
λ
, (2.4)
where h is Planck’s constant and c is the speed of light in vacuum.
2.2 Radiation units and terminology
Radioactivity
Radioactive decay process is described by unit becquerel (Bq) [9]. Becquerel states how
many decays occur in one second [13]. This can be formulated:
1 Bq≡ 1 nuclear disintegration per second.
Becquerel is a small unit and it is common to express activity in kilobecquerel (kBq)
or megabecquerel (MBq).
Dose
Another relevant property of ionizing radiation is its effect. Effects are estimated
through dose values. Radiation dose expresses the amount of energy absorbed in ra-
diation target material, e.g. human tissue [10]. An old unit for dose measurement is
Gray (Gy), that is
1 Gy≡ 1 joule of absorbed energy per kg.
When considering effects of ionizing radiation to biological systems equivalent dose is
used. The energy of radiation causes damage to biological tissue. When the radiation
is absorbed into a small area, the damage can be estimated with a radiation weighting
factor wr [10]. For high energy radiation, i.e. x-rays and γ-rays, the wr is set to 1.
For particle radiation, the wr > 1. The biological effective dose, called the equivalent
dose H, is defined as the product of the physical dose (in Gy) and wr. The unit of the
equivalent dose is sievert (Sv). H is mathematically expressed as
H =wr ·D, (2.5)
where D is the physical dose in grays.
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Sometimes it is useful to calculate an estimate of effective equivalent dose E which
is a sum of the products between equivalent doses affecting a certain human organ
multiplied and weighting factor of that particular organ [10]. The formula for E is
E =w1H1+w2H2+ . . . , (2.6)
where wi is a weighting factor of organ i and Hi its equivalent dose. The unit of the
effective equivalent dose is sievert. The weighting factors of organs are listed in table
2.1
TABLE 2.1: Weighting factors for different organs [10, 14]
Organ Weighting factor wi
Gonads 0.20
Bone marrow, lungs
stomach, colon 0.12
Bladder, breasts, liver, thyroid gland,
esophagus and rest of the tissues 0.05
Skin, surface of the skin 0.01
Total 1.0
Dose rate
Dose rate E˙ describes the change of the effective dose in unit Sv/s. The most practical
unit in radiological events is Sv/h. Mathematical expression of the dose rate reads:
E˙ = dE
dt
. (2.7)
Half-life
When considering radioactive materials and their effects, it is useful to understand
how the activity of the radioactive nuclei change in time. The statistical estimate of
the time during which the activity has decreased into one half of the original is called
half-life and marked shortly as T1/2 [10]. The activity reduction as a function of time
in half-lives is presented in fig. 2.3. This definition of half-life means physical half-life.
When considering radioactive material digested, inhaled, or otherwise taken into
one’s body, it is necessary to talk about biological half-life. This means the time when
half of the radioactive isotopes have been eliminated from the body via the biological
pathways – such as through kidneys, urine, and via perspiration [10]. Since the bio-
logical half-life is highly dependent on metabolism it cannot be precisely defined and
it depends on personal features of the person examined.
In order to notice the significant difference between physical and biological half-
lives, let us compare these values of 137Cs. Its physical half-life is approximately 30
years but during the Chernobyl NPP accident in Ukraine in 1986 the biological half-
life for an adult was defined to be approximately three months [10].
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FIGURE 2.3: Radioactivity percentage as a function of half-life number.
The laws of radioactive decay
To calculate activity, A, of a nuclei, it is done by using formula [10]:
A =−dN
dt
=λ ·N, (2.8)
where N is the number of atoms, and dN describes the change in N during a time
interval dt. λ is a disintegration constant characteristic to an isotope.
An equation of decrease in N can be derived from eq. 2.8 by integrating over time
[10]:
N =N0 · e−λt (2.9)
Furthermore half-life T1/2 and λ are linked via the following equation when setting
N = N02 :
T1/2 =
ln2
λ
. (2.10)
2.3 Biological effects of ionizing radiation
The ionizing radiation effects literally with its ionizing impact on particles, e.g. hu-
man tissue. This section introduces the basic principles of these biological effects on
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humans.
The biological effects on human tissue is risen from the energy that is absorbed into
the tissue from radiation. This energy causes physical changes which leads to chemical
reactions, damaging the micro molecules of cells [15]. The different radiation types
are divided roughly into sparsely and densely ionizing radiation, depending on their
capability to transfer energy to the cells or other medium [16]. The energy deposited
to the medium per length unit travelled in the medium is called linear energy transfer
(LET). LET values of the densely ionizing radiation are thereby higher than the ones of
sparsely ionizing [10]. Deposited energy per length unit, dE/dx, for particle radiation
is described by the Bethe formula, which reads in a simplified form:
dE
dx
≈ k z
2
v2
, (2.11)
where k is coefficient simplifying more complex form of different constants, z is the
charge of the moving particle, and v is its velocity.
As the sparsely ionizing radiation does not interact with medium, it has a longer
range than densely ionizing radiation. Gamma and beta radiations are sparsely ioniz-
ing whereas alpha radiation is densely ionizing.
As mentioned in sec. 2.1.1 alpha radiation wiht energy of 6 MeV has a range of
4.6 cm in the air and 56 µm in the human tissue. Being a densely ionizing species
of radiation, it will deposit its energy very quickly after encountering a medium. In
practice this means that it does not penetrate the skin or even reach the skin from its
origin. The risks with alpha active materials rise when they are inhaled or ingested
since then the alpha-particles are in direct interaction with vital cells. To set an ex-
ample, a 4 MeV alpha-particle causes approximately 23 000 ionizations, which means
the dose for that tissue are is roughly 370 mGy [16].
Beta-particles are less energetic than alpha-radiation [10]. The electrons (or posit-
rons) collide with electrons in the medium and hence have similar behavior in human
tissue than alpha-particles. As a scale, 1 MeV beta-particle has range of 0.5 cm in
human tissue, and 137Cs emits beta-particles with an average energy of 0.2 MeV. If
these β-particles emitted by 137Cs hit the skin, it will not be penetrated through it,
but will cause burn injuries if the skin is exposed to significant amount of radiation.
This cesium isotope is relevant when NPP accidents are considered (see chapter 3).
Gamma radiation penetrates the skin deeper than alpha and beta radiation. Gamma-
rays can penetrate soft tissue and concrete. Another way to demonstrate its pervasive
properties is so called half-value layer, which for water is 9 cm. This means that 50 %
of gamma quanta emitted by 137Cs, with energy of 0.662 MeV, penetrates a 9 cm layer
of water [10]. The fig. 2.4 shows the schematics of radiation penetration for alpha,
beta, and gamma radiation.
2.3.1 Deterministic and stochastic effects
The effects of ionizing radiation can be divided in two categories: deterministic and
stochastic effects of radiation. The deterministic effects occur when a person is ex-
posed to a large dose of radiation and the effects are inevitable when a certain dose
threshold is exceeded. Deterministic effects originate from vast damaging of the cells.
Large doses are related usually to radiation treatment or a severe nuclear accident.
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FIGURE 2.4: Penetration capability schematics for different types of radiation. Illus-
tration motivated by [10].
These deterministic effects are – for example – radiation sickness with damages in
bone marrow and intestines, radiation burn, and fetal damage [15]. The threshold
value for damage and damage rate depend highly on dose rate: if the large dose is
spread to a long period of time the threshold value is lower and damages are less se-
vere. Protecting individuals from deterministic effects is a corner stone of radiation
protection.
Stochastic effects are statistical injurious effects that are caused by a random ge-
netic change in a cell [15]. Statistical effects can originate from any small radiation
exposure. There are no threshold values for these effects, but the probability of them
increase when the dose increases. The most significant factor is the cumulative dose
through life-time. Stochastic effects are not significant to a single individual but for
the population the effects can be remarkable if a large number of people have been
exposed.
Not all deterministic effects are immediate. They can also appear or alter for worse
through time. However, the stochastic effects require a latent phase of at least few
years.
Chapter 3
Radioactive materials in fission
reactors and dispersion of the
particles released from a nuclear
power plant
This chapter introduces which radioactive materials are included in the conventional
large light water nuclear reactors. The uranium used as the fuel of the nuclear reactor
is radioactive, but the reaction products of the fission reaction are highly radioactive
as well. To understand the radioactivity of the nuclear fuel and its fission products, we
first discussed radioactive decay in general in section 2.1. How the fission reactions
happen and lead to radiating nuclei is introduced in section 3.1
Section 3.2 introduces briefly the studied Finnish NPPs and section 3.3 covers the
basics of nuclear power plant accidents. In section 3.4 we discuss the dispersion and
deposition of radioactive materials.
3.1 Fission reactions
In fission reaction a heavy nucleus decays into two daughter nuclei [17]. Typically two
or three neutrons are emitted in the process as well as gamma and neutrino radiation.
Nuclei in which fission reaction can occur are called fissionable. If a low-energy neu-
tron, usually referred as thermal neutron, can induce a fission reaction in a nucleus, it
is called a fissile nucleus. A common neutron-induced fission reaction is [18]:
235U + n −→ 93Rb + 141Cs + 2n.
Furthermore, the radioactivity yields from the fission products which are radioac-
tive as well, usually they emit β and γ radiation. Two examples of fission product
decay chains are below [18]:
93Rb 6 s−−−−−→ 93Sr 7 min−−−−−−→ 93Y 10 h−−−−−→ 93Zr 10
6 y−−−−−→ 93Nb
141Cs 25 s−−−−−→ 141Ba 18 min−−−−−−→ 141La 4 h−−−−−→ 141Ce 33 d−−−−−→ 141Pr
11
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3.1.1 Relevant fission products in a release
There are a number of fission products released in a nuclear accident. Within the scope
of this thesis, three particular isotopes, iodine-131, cesium-134, and cesium-137, are
given a special attention. Other nuclei modelled in the thesis are listed in chapter 6.
Iodine and cesium are significant because of their radioactive properties. Radioactive
iodine-131 is a β− emitting isotope which clusters into thyroid and later on in the decay
chain, it emits a gamma quantum [14]. Iodine-131 has half-life of circa 8 days [19].
Cesium isotopes are strong gamma emitters through beta-decay. Cesium-137 has a
long half-life of approximately 30 years and the half-life of cesium-134 is circa 2 years,
hence their deposition after NPP accident is meaningful for protective action planning
[19]. The protective actions during an nuclear accident are discussed in more detail in
chapter 4.
Radioactive iodine and cesium isotopes are solid in room temperature. In the high
temperature circumstances of a nuclear reactor they are gasified, which make their
release from the fuel more possible [17]. They can form radioactive particles e.g. via
condensation and hence cause a significant radiological risk for people and the envi-
ronment [20].
3.2 Finnish nuclear power plants
In this thesis the operational Finnish nuclear power plants are studied. Currently
there are two operational NPP sites in Finland at Loviisa and Olkiluoto. Loviisa has
two pressurized light water VVER-440 reactor units and Olkiluoto has two boiling
water reactor units [21, 22]. Table 3.1 collects the basic information of these NPPs.
Fuel inventories used in this thesis are retrieved from STUK’s database containing
the information of current reactor inventory. Release scenarios are discussed in more
detail in chapter 6. More information on the fuel inventories before current power
upgrades are found in reference [6].
TABLE 3.1: Power information of the Finnish operational NPP-units [21, 22].
NPP unit Reactor type Thermal power(MW)
Electrical power
(MW)
Loviisa 1&2 PWR 1500 507
Olkiluoto 1&2 BWR 2500 890
3.3 Nuclear power plant accidents
Nuclear power plant accidents can occur from many initial events. A release happens
when the integrity of the nuclear fuel element and containment building are compro-
mised, and the safety systems do not work properly. In such case fission products can
leave the fuel element, leak into containment building, and be released to the envi-
ronment through the damaged containment building. The fuel damage is caused by
elevated temperature. The rise of the temperature can be caused for example in a
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case of a loss of coolant accident (LOCA) [17]. LOCA in pressurized water reactor,
like in Loviisa, means that primary circuit is damaged and the coolant leaks into the
containment building and the reactor core is exposed. In boiling water reactor similar
scenario would be breaking of the main steam line.
After the core is exposed the fuel temperature rises and causes damage and leak of
radioactive material into the containment building. At this point the integrity of the
containment building becomes crucial. The scenarios studied in this thesis are based
on different integrity levels of the containment building and how large a portion of the
release is stopped by the containment building, which has the purpose of delaying the
release into the environment. Chapter 6 introduces these scenarios in more detail. For
further detail on accidents, the book Ydinturvallisuus published by STUK summarizes
the basics of different accident categories [17].
3.4 Dispersion and deposition of radioactive materi-
als
Dispersion of the radioactive material depends roughly on three circumstantial as-
pects: contents of the release, height of the release, and weather conditions. Contents
in this case means both the isotope distribution and the state of the material. Mate-
rials can be released as solid particles, gas, or aerosols [14]. Supersaturated steam
forms particles and particles can coagulate and form larger particles, which affect the
dispersion. Radioactive particles decay through time, which changes the compositions
of the release cloud.
The key weather conditions are wind and vertical temperature profile. Wind deter-
mines the horizontal direction and temperature differences create pressure gradients
affecting the vertical dispersion. Aerosol particles are modelled in general with Brow-
nian motion and diffusion [14]. The size of the particles is related to the distance of
dispersion. Larger particles are more affected by the gravity than the smaller ones.
Large particles therefore are deposited faster, i.e. within shorter distance from the
source, than the smaller particles.
At the end of the airborne dispersion, the radioactive particles fall-out on the sur-
face of the ground via wet and dry deposition [14]. The scope of this thesis does not
cover deposition to the marine area or lakes.
In the dry deposition the particles drift near ground surface and stick to it [14].
Rainfall, fog, and snow cause the wet deposition. The particles dissolve to water and
therefore the wet deposition is much more efficient than the dry deposition.
The dispersion and deposition models used in this study are discussed in more
detail in chapter 5. The cited book Säteily ympäristössä, published by STUK, offers a
broader general description of dispersion and deposition [14].
Chapter 4
Emergency preparedness and
protective actions during a nuclear
power plant accident
This chapter presents the Finnish means to prepare for a radiological nuclear power
plant accident and the protective actions during such emergency event. The guide-
lines for the protective actions are stated in the emergency preparedness guides (VAL-
guides) 1 & 2 [23, 24]. A nuclear or radiological emergency is divided into early, inter-
mediate, and recovery phases [25]. This thesis studies early and intermediate phase
related quantities. The contents of VAL-guides are discussed in more detail in section
4.2. Later on, protective actions in this thesis refer specifically to actions taken during
a nuclear emergency.
A nuclear or radiological emergency is a situation when there is a threat of an
event or an event has occurred, which lead to public’s and/or rescue and protective
personnel’s exposure to higher amount radiation than normally [23].
In section 4.1 the emergency planning zones of the Finnish nuclear power are
briefly introduced. If an NPP accident should occur VAL-guides dictate the proper
actions for protecting the population. Section 4.2 discusses these protective actions
and how their need during an emergency is defined.
4.1 Emergency planning zones of the nuclear power
plants
In Finland, STUK’s regulation STUK Y/2/2018 orders a nuclear power plant to have
precautionary action zone (PAZ), which is an are with radius of circa 5 km from the
site [26]. The PAZ has limitations in land use. The same regulation defines an area
with circa 20 km radius from the NPP site, which is called emergency planning zone
(EPZ). Inside the EPZ, the authorities must make an external rescue plan referred in
Rescue Act (379/2011) section 48(1)(1) [3].
The EPZ and PAZ for a imaginary NPP are illustrated in figure 4.1. It must be
noted, that in practice the zones are defined with respect to municipality and city
borders, not with exact circles.
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Nuclear power plant
Precatutionary action zone, 5 km
Emergency planning zone, 20 km
FIGURE 4.1: Schematics of Finnish NPP site emergency planning zones.
4.2 Protective actions during a nuclear power plant
accident
Purpose and reasoning of protective actions
The VAL-guides state that the goal of any protective actions is to keep the population’s
radiation dose exposure as low as reasonably and practically possible. Another goal
is to minimize any other disadvantages for society and to help normalizing the living
conditions and functions of the society [23].
Reference level of dose
In Finland the primary reference level of dose is set to 20 mSv [23]. This level guides
the protective actions to keep the residual dose of an individual under that level during
the first year after the initial event. The reference level should be re-evaluated during
the event. The level should be lowered in time until a permanently acceptable level is
reached.
Dose criteria of the protective actions and operational intervention levels
The basis of each protective action is a certain dose criteria, which should not be ex-
ceeded [23]. A protective action should take place if its dose criterion is estimated to
be exceeded. From these criteria are derived the operational intervention levels (OILs),
which can be measured during the emergency. OILs are given as external radiation
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dose rates (µSv/h), deposition (Bq/m2), and air activity concentration (Bq/m3). The nu-
merical values of these criteria and intervention levels are introduced on the section
4.2.1 along the relevant protective actions.
Since dose estimation includes significant uncertainties, OILs and dose criteria
are not strict values but to be used as guidance and in magnitude evaluation. These
values are given for the most exposed population group and for an unprotected person.
An unprotected person has not sheltered inside, been evacuated, or received iodine
prophylaxis [25].
VAL-guide 1 lists situations when protective actions are justified with respect to
the reference level of dose. Protective actions are justified, if the annual dose following
the accident is estimated to be [23]:
• over 10 mSv: actions to reduce exposure to be taken
• 1-10 mSv: protective actions are usually justified
• less than 1 mSv: actions to reduce can be taken if they are easily and reasonably
executable.
If a dose of 100 mSv is expected to be exceeded in a short period of time (approxi-
mately 24 hours), protective actions are unconditionally necessary and to be executed
urgently.
Contamination levels
Contamination levels describe the magnitude of the fallout [23]. They are primarily
defined based on the external dose rate from deposited radio nuclides. Contamination
levels assist in the decontamination processes, which are not studied within the scope
of this thesis, but it is helpful to familiarize oneself with these levels, since deposition
quantities are studied.
4.2.1 Protective actions
This section introduces considerable protective actions including the dose criteria and
operational intervention levels related to them. All descriptions are based on VAL-
guides, unless otherwise cited. Summary of the dose criteria and operational inter-
vention levels for early phase of an emergency is in table 4.2 and for intermediate
phase in the table 4.3.
Sheltering indoors and partial sheltering indoors
Sheltering indoors reduces the exposure to airborne radioactive particles and de-
creases the dose caused by external radiation. Sheltering should take place well
before the radioactive cloud passes the area. This means the order ought to be given
4 hours in advance or as soon as possible if it is not possible to give this order within
this time frame. To prevent the radioactive particles from ending up indoors, should
the air condition of all possible buildings be turned off. Doors, windows, chimneys and
other airways should be sealed.
Sheltering should not last more than 48 hours, since other disadvantages related
to everyday life increase quickly when being sheltered for a long period of time. Also,
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TABLE 4.1: Contamination levels [24]
Contamination
level
External dose
rate
Combined γ- and
β-emitter
deposition
α-emitter
deposition
capable to sever
from the ground
Extremely
contaminated
over 100 µSv/h over 10 MBq/m2 over 100 kBq/m2
Heavily
contaminated
10-100 µSv/h 1-10 MBq/m2 10-100 kBq/m2
Contaminated 1-10 µSv/h 100 - 1000 kBq/m2 1-10 kBq/m2
Slightly
contaminated
less than 1 µSv/h
yet over normal
background
radiation
less than 100
kBq/m2
less than 1 kBq/m2
Non-
contaminated
Dose rate in the
level of normal
background
radiation
no contamination
or very low
contamination
no contamination
or very low
contamination
the indoors contamination is inevitable after 48 hours in the area of the influence of
the radioactive cloud, regardless of window sealing and turning off the air condition.
Less invasive protective action is partial sheltering. It is recommended in situa-
tions when there are radioactive particles in the air and environment, but the shel-
tering is not necessary. In partial sheltering one should avoid unnecessary staying
outdoors.
Only in case of nuclear explosion it is necessary to shelter into air-raid shelters.
This corresponds to estimated dose of 100 mSv in 24 hours. This scenario is out of the
scope of this thesis.
In early phase dose criterion for sheltering is that 10 mSv dose is predicted to
be exceeded during the next 48 hours. Significant operational intervention levels are
when dose rate exceedes or it is predicted to be over 100 µSv/h or when airborne strong
gamma emitter concentration exceeds 10 kBq/m3. Other OILs are with respect to shel-
tering are listed in table 4.2. Partial sheltering has similar operational intervention
level, but with smaller order of magnitude. Dose criterion being 1-10 mSv during
48 hours, dose rate being 10 µSv/h, and gamma emitter air concentration 1 kBq/m3.
Other OILs are listed in the table 4.2.
In the intermediate phase, the dose criterion and dose rate OIL for sheltering are
the same as in the early phase. For partial sheltering, dose criterion is 10 mSv ex-
posure during the first month but under 10 mSv during 48 hours. Dose rate OIL
for partial sheltering is 10-100 µSv/h. In the intermediate phase the total activity is
no more changing and all the radioactive material is deposited. Considering strong
gamma emitter deposition, operational intervention level to start or continue shelter-
ing is 10 MBq/m2. For partial sheltering this value is 1-10 MBq/m2. Other OILs are
found in table 4.3.
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Iodine prophylaxis
As mentioned in section 3.1.1 the radioactive iodine can be released in NPP accident
and therefore can end up inside human body via inhalation, via food, water and milk,
or externally when handling contaminated surfaces. With the intake of stable iodine,
one can prevent the radioactive iodine from accruing into thyroid during early phase
of emergency. It does not reduce dose to other organs.
Iodine prophylaxis is very important to children and the pregnant. The thyroids
of children and fetuses are more sensitive to radiation effects. The dose criterion for
iodine prophylaxis is a thyroid dose of 100 mGy for adults and thyroid dose of 10 mGy
for children and the pregnant. Corresponding OILs for adults are 100 µSv/h dose rate
or radioactive iodine air concentration greater than 10 kBq/m3. For children and the
pregnant, these OILs are 10 µSv/h and 1 kBq/m3.
One should not exit indoors to purchase iodine tablets if sheltering indoors is al-
ready ordered. Iodine prophylaxis is always a complementary action to sheltering
indoors. The iodine should be taken in 1-6 hours before exposure to radioactive iodine
to maximize its benefits. One should not take stable iodine 12 hours after the inhala-
tion of radioactive iodine, since the stable iodine slows down the radioactive iodine
from leaving the thyroid.
Evacuation, relocation and access control
In case of a nuclear emergency and its early phase, if a severe accident is anticipated
the population in precautionary action zone is evacuated and iodine prophylaxis is or-
dered to them. Otherwise, evacuation should be considered if the release is estimated
to last over 48 hours and/or sheltering need is over hours. Access control actions are
in order to those areas evacuated or where sheltering indoors is ordered.
In the intermediate phase, there can be a short term evacuation in the contami-
nated areas when the first week dose is estimated to be 20 mSv or over. Operational
intervention levels exceeding for more than 48 hours are dose rate of 100 µSv/h and
strong gamma emitter deposition of 10 MBq/m2. Other OILs are listed in table 4.3. If
dose is estimated to be over 10 mSv during one month, temporary relocation can be
considered. OILs related to relocation are in table 4.3. Access control in the interme-
diate phase is in order in the areas where evacuation or sheltering is ordered.
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TABLE 4.2: Dose criterion and the directive operational intervention levels related to
them in the early phase of an emergency.
EARLY PHASE
Protective action Dose criterion and/or operational intervention level
Sheltering indoors
• Dose ≥ 10 mSv in 48 hours.
• External dose rate is or is predicted to be > 100 µSv/h, or
• α-emitter concentration > 1 Bq/m3 (Pu-239, Am-241), or
• β-emitter concentration > 1 kBq/m3 (Sr-90), or
• Strong γ-emitter concentration in total > 10 kBq/m3
(Cs-137, I-131, etc.)
Partial sheltering
indoors
• Dose: 1-10 mSv in 48 hours.
• External dose rate is, or is predicted to be, > 10 µSv/h, or
• α-emitter concentration > 0.1 Bq/m3 (Pu-239, Am-241),
or
• β-emitter concentration > 100 Bq/m3 (Sr-90), or
• Strong γ-emitter concentration in total > 1 kBq/m3 (Cs-
137, I-131, etc.)
Iodine prophylaxis
(adults)
• Thyroid dose over 100 mGy.
• External dose rate is or is predicted to be > 100 µSv/h, or
• Air concentration of radioactive iodine during 48 hours is
or is predicted to be > 10 kBq/m3
Iodine prophylaxis
(children and the
pregnant)
• Thyroid dose over 10 mGy.
• External dose rate is or is predicted
to be > 10 µSv/h, or
• Air concentration of radioactive iodine during 48 hours is
or is predicted to be > 1 kBq/m3
Evacuation
• Dose during first week after accident is predicted to be >
20 mSv.
• It is likely that the need of sheltering indoors is more than
48 hours
Access control
• External dose rate is or is predicted to be > 100 µSv/h, or
• α-emitter concentration > 1 Bq/m3 (Pu-239, Am-241), or
• β-emitter concentration > 1 kBq/m3 (Sr-90), or
• Strong γ-emitter concentration in total > 10 kBq/m3
(Cs-137, I-131, etc.), or
• Areas where sheltering or evacuation is ordered.
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TABLE 4.3: Dose criterion and the directive operational intervention levels related to
them in the intermediate phase of an emergency.
INTERMEDIATE PHASE
Protective action Dose criterion and/or operational intervention level
Sheltering indoors
• Dose ≥ 10 mSv in 48 hours.
• External dose rate is or is predicted to be > 100 µSv/h, or
• Strong γ- and β-emitter deposition in total > 10 MBq/m2
(Cs-137, I-131, Sr-90 etc.), or
• α-emitter deposition is > 100 kBq/m2 (Pu-239, Am-241)
assuming the emitters are able to leave ground surface
Partial sheltering
indoors
• Dose ≥ 10 mSv in two months but < 10 mSv in 48 hours.
• External dose rate is, or is predicted to be, > 10 µSv/h,
but < 100 µSv/h, or
• Strong γ- and β-emitter deposition in total is 1-10
MBq/m2
(Cs-137, I-131, Sr-90 etc.), or
• α-emitter deposition is 10-100 kBq/m2 (Pu-239, Am-241)
assuming the emitters are able to leave ground surface
Evacuation
• Dose during first week after accident is predicted to be >
20 mSv
• External dose rate is, or is predicted to be, > 10 µSv/h, or
• Strong γ- and β-emitter deposition in total > 10 MBq/m3
(Cs-137, I-131, Sr-90 etc.), or
• α-emitter deposition is > 100 kBq/m2 (Pu-239, Am-241)
assuming the emitters are able to leave ground surface,
or
• It is likely that the need of sheltering indoors is more than
48 hours
Relocation
• Dose during first month after accident is predicted to be >
10 mSv
• External dose rate is, or is predicted to be, > 10 µSv/h
regardless of decontamination, or
• Strong γ- and β-emitter deposition in total > 1 MBq/m3
(Cs-137, I-131, Sr-90 etc.) regardless of decontamination,
or
• α-emitter deposition is > 10 kBq/m2 (Pu-239, Am-241) as-
suming the emitters are able to leave ground surface re-
gardless of decontamination, or
Access control • Areas where sheltering or evacuation is ordered.
Chapter 5
Modeling airborne dispersion of
radioactive release and doses
to the population
This chapter introduces the calculation process used in the thesis. Firstly, we discuss
the weather data used in calculations in section 5.1. Section 5.2 covers the calcula-
tions considering the dispersion of the radioactive release and the deposition calcula-
tions related to these releases. The dispersion and deposition calculations are made
with dispersion model SILAM developed by the Finnish Meteorological Institute (FMI)
[27]. Dose calculations are done with STUK’s threat assessment tool TIUKU based on
SILAM results. The fundamentals of these dose calculations are introduced in section
5.4.3.
The overall calculation process is illustrated in fig.5.1. The post processing meth-
ods of the data is discussed more in chapter 7.
5.1 Weather data
The weather data for the calculations used in the purposes of this thesis was collected
by Finnish Meteorogical Institute (FMI) [28]. Data covers operative weather forecasts
from years 2012-2015. The weather models used at FMI are AROME and HARMONIE
[29]. In the years 2012-2013 AROME was used whereas HARMONIE was used in
2014-2015. The data comprehensiveness percentage for each studied year is given in
table in table 5.1.
TABLE 5.1: Coverage percentage of the weather data for each year [28].
Year Coverage percentage (%)
2012 95
2013 100
2014 98
2015 98
To determine the representativeness of the weather conditions of the studied time
period they were compared to the climatic comparison period of 1981-2010 [28]. The
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Weather forecast data 2012-2015
Dispersion and deposition calcuations
Dose calculations
Post processing data
AROME & HARMONIE
SILAM
TIUKU
Python and QGIS
FIGURE 5.1: The calculation process.
analysis showed that the most significant characteristic of the time period 2012-2015
was the exceptional high average temperature of the years 2013-2015. The high tem-
peratures took place in the summer in 2013 and in the winter during 2014 and 2015.
5.2 Dispersion and deposition calculations using
SILAM
The disperision and deposition calculations are done using SILAM – a global-to-meso-
scale dispersion model – based on weather data discussed in sec. 5.1. SILAM is an
acronym for System for Integrated modeLing of Atmospheric coMposition. The devel-
opment process of SILAM is continuous and, for the purposes of this thesis, SILAM
version 5.4 was used.
SILAM model includes both Eulerian and Lagrangian transport methods [30]. The
data produced for this analysis was done using Eulerian method. It is based on a
dispersion equation which takes into account the concentration of the radioactive ma-
terial, source term, coordinates of the particles, transport velocity, turbulent diffusion,
air density, and transformation and sink processes. For more thorough description see
[31].
5.3 Modeling parameters
In all cases the calculation grids were set to 300 km radius from the nuclear power
plant site [28]. The AROME model set some restrictions since it covers only Finland
and none of the neighbouring countries. Using the Eulerian method, it was possible
to use same grid for the weather modeling and dispersion calculations. However, the
switch from AROME to HARMONIE caused a change in the grids. Therefore the
results from the dispersion calculations were unified by interpolating them linearly.
The final grid had a resolution of 0.02◦×0.02◦ in longitude-latitude projection.
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FIGURE 5.2: Wind rose of Loviisa in 2012-2015 [28].
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FIGURE 5.3: Wind rose of Olkiluoto in 2012-2015 [28].
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Vertically the calculations were done in 16 layers, highest reaching 10 km from
the ground surface. The layer thickness varied depending on the altitude. The lowest
layer was 40 m thick, between 1-4 km 500 m, between 4-6 km 1000m, and 6-10 km
2000 m.
For each case, the time step was 2 minutes and the calculations were executed for
time period of 48 hours after the release. There were two sets of releases considering
different nuclides. One release was 3 hours and the other was 12 hours. These releases
were set to begin at 00 UTC and 12 UTC for each day during the 2012-2015 period.
More details about the release scenarios is in chapter 6. Naturally the power plant
sites were the starting point of each scenario: Loviisa (26.342◦ E, 60.372◦ N) and
Olkiluoto (21.444◦ E, 61.235◦ N). The releases were modeled as point-like release in
the altitude of 90-110 m.
Each release consisted of the noble gases chromium-88, chromium-88, xenon-133,
and xenon-135. Iodine-131 was modelled in forms of gas and aerosol. Other aerosol
nuclei were: strontium-89, strontium-90, tellurium-127m, cesium-134, and cesium-
137. The used source terms are introduced in more detail in chapter 6. The aerosols
in the model had average diameter of 0.6 µm.
5.4 Radioactive decay, deposition and dose calcula-
tions in the model
5.4.1 Decay
SILAM model calculates radioactive decay of the released nuclei from air and deposi-
tion activity. The Eulerian model calculates the decay for every time step for each grid
point. The simulations consider the daughter nuclei from the following decay chains:
87Kr → 87Rb 88Kr → 88Rb 135Xe → 135Cs
131I → 131mXe 90Sr → 90Y 127mTe → 127Te
137Cs → 137mBa 241Pu → 237U 241Am → 241Pu
Considering other simulated nuclei, the decay is taken into account but the decay
products are neglected.
5.4.2 Deposition
The deposition of the SILAM model is based on dry and wet deposition [28]. The dry
deposition is based on the deposition velocity of the particles, vd. Dry deposition flux
F [Bqm−2s−1] can be expressed with this velocity as [32]:
F =−vdc(zref), (5.1)
where c(zref) is the activity concentration on the lowest calculation surface above the
point of deposition. SILAM uses the following estimate for the deposition velocity
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[32, 33]:
vd =
1
ra+ rb+ rarbvs
+vs, (5.2)
where ra is aerodynamic resistance, rb is quasi-laminar layer resistance, and vs is
settling velocity which is assumed to be constant.
SILAM models the particle reduction caused by wet deposition point-wise with the
dime derivative of air activity concentration such that [34]:
dc
dt
=−Λc, (5.3)
where c is activity concentration of air and Λ is scavenging coefficient or so called
washout coefficient. Λ describes the rate of loss of gases or aerosol particles from
atmosphere via rain or snow. The cumulative wet deposition is calculated by summing
up the particle reduction in the grid points above the deposition point. The three
dimensional distribution of the scavenging coefficient is defined from total rainfall of
HARMONIE and AROME weather data.
5.4.3 Dose calculation method
STUK’s threat assesment tool TIUKU calculates dose rates and doses from deposition
and airborne activity concentration near the ground level [35]. Ground level is chosen
as an approximation to make the calculation time more reasonable. The activity is
divided into an even grid of point sources. Effective dose and thyroid dose for adults
and one year old children are calculated in this study. Pathways are inhalation and
external dose from radioactive cloud and fallout [36, 37]. The dose rate conversion
factors are retrieved from the data base of JRODOS decisiono support system and
calculated in accordance with the recommendations of the ICRP-119 document [38,
39]. Dose calculations are made on two time integration intervals: first 48 hours after
release and first 7 days after release.
Chapter 6
Accident scenariosandsource terms
In this thesis the accident scenarios are studied for two sites and for two reactor types:
Loviisa 1 & 2 and Olkiluoto 1 &2. The scenarios are divided to three different cases.
These cases are evaluations to estimate a small release (later basic case), a large re-
lease (later large case), and a very large release (later very large case). They are de-
scribed in more detail below and the source terms are summarized in tables 6.1 and
6.2. Each release case is based on a certain fixed source term parameters, which then
are scaled according to reactor inventory. Inventory is related to the power of the
reactor.
The purpose of these different cases is to create estimates for the need of protec-
tive actions. Hence, these source term values are somewhat gross, since the precise
inventories and all of the initial circumstances of an accident are unique for each re-
actor and for each real-life case. The assumption in all scenarios is that the reactor
has been shutdown in some way. Thereby the fission chain reaction has ended and the
problems are caused by the decay heat.
Basic case
The basic case estimates a case that the containment building of the reactor is not
completely impermeable anymore. The release from the containment starts six hours
after the fission chain reaction has ended. The release of 137Cs, 134Cs, and 131I are
fixed to 100 TBq. This release occurs through the first 3 hours. In the same time
window 0.4 TBq of 89Sr, 90Sr isotopes are released and 40 TBq of 127mTe. During the
first 12 hours it is estimated that 2% of the 87Kr, 88Kr, 133Xe, and 135Xe inventories
are released.
Large case
Large case release describes a situation where containment building is damaged quick
after the end of the fission chain reaction. This time after shutdown has been set to
one hour. The release to the environment from the damaged containment building is
defined so that 1% from the 137Cs, 134Cs, and 131I inventories of the reactor during the
first three hours of the release. Through same time window are released 0.4% of the
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127mTe inventory and 0.004% of the 89Sr, 90Sr inventories. During the first 12 hours
the release consists 20% of the 87Kr, 88Kr, 133Xe, and 135Xe inventories.
Very large case
The worst case studied is to estimate the consequences of a very large release. The case
simulates a maintenance shutdown where the containment building is not secured and
there are significant pathways for the release. The release starts 48 hours after the
end of the chain reaction. During the first three hours the release is one magnitude
higher than in the large case. This means 10% of the 137Cs, 134Cs, and 131I inventories,
4% of the 127mTe inventory, and 0.04% of the 89Sr, 90Sr inventories. During the first 12
hours the 87Kr, 88Kr, 133Xe, and 135Xe inventories are completely released.
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TABLE 6.1: Loviisa 1&2 release scenarios.
LOVIISA 1&2
Case Start of therelease∗
Release during the
first 3 h
Release during the
first 12 h
Basic 6 hours
– 137Cs: 100 TBq
– 134Cs: 147 TBq
– 131I: 882 TBq
– 89Sr 3.2 TBq
– 90Sr: 0.3 TBq
– 127mTe: 53 TBq
– 87Kr: 19 TBq
– 88Kr: 1000 TBq
– 133Xe: 58 000 TBq
– 135Xe: 22 000 TBq
Large 1 hour
– 137Cs: 1600 TBq
– 134Cs: 2400 TBq
– 131I: 15 000 TBq
– 89Sr 52 TBq
– 90Sr: 4.7 TBq
– 127mTe: 850 TBq
– 87Kr: 3000 TBq
– 88Kr: 34 200 TBq
– 133Xe: 584 000 TBq
– 135Xe: 226 000 TBq
Very
Large 48 hours
– 137Cs: 16 200 TBq
– 134Cs: 23 800 TBq
– 131I: 146 000 TBq
– 89Sr 520 TBq
– 90Sr: 47 TBq
– 127mTe: 8500 TBq
– 87Kr: 25 600 TBq
– 88Kr: 219 000 TBq
– 133Xe: 2 920 000 TBq
– 135Xe: 1 110 000 TBq
∗Hours after the end of the fission chain reaction.
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TABLE 6.2: Olkiluoto 1&2 release scenarios.
OLKILUOTO 1&2
Case Start of therelease∗
Release during the
first 3 h
Release during the
first 12 h
Basic 6 hours
– 137Cs: 100 TBq
– 134Cs: 109 TBq
– 131I: 1000 TBq
– 89Sr 4.4 TBq
– 90Sr: 0.3 TBq
– 127mTe: 5.6 TBq
– 87Kr: 40 TBq
– 88Kr: 2000 TBq
– 133Xe: 102 000 TBq
– 135Xe: 42 000 TBq
Large 1 hour
– 137Cs: 2400 TBq
– 134Cs: 2600 TBq
– 131I: 24 700 TBq
– 89Sr 105 TBq
– 90Sr: 7.2 TBq
– 127mTe: 134 TBq
– 87Kr: 6000 TBq
– 88Kr: 70 000 TBq
– 133Xe: 1 029 000 TBq
– 135Xe: 454 000 TBq
Very
Large 48 hours
– 137Cs: 24 000 TBq
– 134Cs: 26 300 TBq
– 131I: 248 000 TBq
– 89Sr 1000 TBq
– 90Sr: 72 TBq
– 127mTe: 1340 TBq
– 87Kr: 51 800 TBq
– 88Kr: 446 000 TBq
– 133Xe: 5 152 000 TBq
– 135Xe: 2 257 000 TBq
∗Hours after the end of the fission chain reaction.
Chapter 7
Post-processing methods
Post-processing of the dispersion and dose calculation data is done with Python 2.7.
The SILAM model outputs netCDF files. These are processed with Python’s netCDF4
module [40]. The computational postprocessing is done with NumPy library for scien-
tific computation and csv library is harnessed to convert the data to suitable format
for map production [41, 42]. The map products are produced with geographic informa-
tion system software QGIS version 2.18 and finalized with vector graphics software
InkScape [43, 44]. All these software products are open source and freeware.
7.1 Choosing the studied weather scenarios from
the data
Since the weather is rather hard to forecast and the four years of weather data con-
tains also some extreme weather conditions. Therefore it is necessary to neglect some
of the weather scenarios in order to do a sensible analysis. For the purposes of this
thesis, it was chosen to use 95th percentile of the data. A simplified explanation of
this is that 5% of the most extreme weather conditions, e.g. storms, are ruled out of
the analysis. For an extended explanation, percentile means that if a certain value xp
of all possible values X corresponds to percentile p there are p% of values which are
equal to this particular value or less [45]. This can be demonstrated with a probabil-
ity P with respect to some general distribution function F (which in our case would
correspond to weather scenarios):
P(X < xp)=
∫ xp
−∞
F(x)= 1− p/100.
Being an analysis of potential consequnces in NPP accidents, not an thorough re-
view of the emergency planning zones (see SSM’s review [7]), it is justified to consider
as much as 95% of the weather scenarios. In the SSM’s review 70th-90th percentiles
were used.
The percentiles were calculated from the dispersion and dose data with percentile
function in the NumPy library. When the desired amount of cases were processed the
data was converted to comma-separated values with functions from Python’s csv
library.
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Chapter 8
The results of the dispersion
modeling and discussion
This chapter consists of the results from the dispersion and dose calculations. The
activity concentrations in the air are discussed in sec. 8.1. Section 8.2 introduces
selected results considering deposition. In section 8.3 the results considering doses
and dose rates – linked to operational intervention levels – are shown. In this study
thyroid dose and combined inhalation and external dose are calculated. Doses are
defined for adults and one year old children.
The map products shown in this thesis are based on 95 percentile data of years
2012-2015. They show which consequences are possible in which locations in all cal-
culated weather scenarios, not in a single release scenario. This way an assessment
can be made whether the current PAZ and EPZ are valid or not. To set an example:
compare two single scenarios of cesium deposition in figure 8.1 to those results from
the whole data shown in section 8.2.
The last section of this chapter, sec. 8.5, covers the comparison of the results, the
dose criteria and the operational intervention levels of the VAL-guides.
8.1 Activity concentrations in the air
The duration when strong gamma emitter air concentration exceeds 10 kBq/m3 in the
very large case during the first 48 hours after release is shown for Loviisa in fig. 8.2
and for Olkiluoto in fig. 8.3. The maximum time period is 4-5 hours at both sites.
These figures show that it is possible for the observed gamma emitter concentration
to reach 4-5 hour duration circa 150 km from Loviisa site at Lappeenranta and circa
200 km from Olkiluoto site at Seinäjoki.
8.2 Deposition
Considering the intermediate phase of a radiological emergency, it is useful to asses
the extent of cesium deposition and strong gamma emitter deposition after 48 hours
of the release. Section 8.2.1 introduces the possible deposition scenarios for cesium
deposition for both sites and for all release cases. In section 8.2.2 the equivalent ex-
amination is done for all studied strong gamma emitters, cesium isotopes included.
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01/26/2012
0 - 10 kBq/m²
10 - 100 kBq/m²
100 kBq/m² - 1 MBq/m²
1 - 2 MBq/m²
2 - 4 MBq/m²
27/09/2014
0 - 10 kBq/m²
10 - 100 kBq/m²
100 kBq/m² - 1 MBq/m²
1 - 2 MBq/m²
2 - 4 MBq/m²
Cesium deposition after 48 hours
Case: large
Loviisa NPP
5 km zone
20 km zone
FIGURE 8.1: Combined 137Cs and 134Cs deposition after 48 hours in Loviisa large
case for two single weather scenarios: Jan 26, 2012 and Sep 27, 2014.
8.2.1 Cesium deposition
Figures 8.4-8.8 show deposition for all Loviisa cases for combined 137Cs and 134Cs
deposition after 48 hours. Similar cesium depositions for Olkiluoto cases are in figures
8.5-8.9.
The Loviisa (fig. 8.4) and Olkiluoto (fig. 8.5) basic cases show that for small re-
lease the prospected cesium depositions remain under 300 kBq/m2. For Loviisa, the
depositions in all scenarios do not reach the 20 km EPZ border. For Olkiluoto this EPZ
border is exceeded for some weather scenarios with deposition under 50 kBq/m2 but
practically in every scenario the deposition over 100 kBq/m2 is within the 5 km UPZ.
For large cases the cesium depositions are presented in figure 8.6 for Loviisa and
in figure 8.7 for Olkiluoto. For both sites the maximum deposition is circa 4 MBq/m2
and it remains within the 5 km zone. Deposition over 1 MBq/m2 does not exceed the
emergency preparedness zone.
Figures 8.8 and 8.9 show the very large cases. The maximum depositions are circa
40 MBq/m2 for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto. For the studied scenarios, the 10 MBq/m2
deposition is likely to stay within the EPZ and the maximum values within UPZ at
both sites.
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25 0 25 50 75 100 km
Case: very large
0 - 1 h
1 - 2 h
2 - 3 h
3 - 4 h
4 - 5 h
Loviisa NPP
5 km zone
20 km zone
100 km zone
Duration when strong gamma
emitter air concentration
exceeds 10 kBq/m³ during
first 48 hours
FIGURE 8.2: Time map of duration when gamma emitter air activity concentration
10 kBq/m3 is exceeded in Loviisa very large case.
8.2.2 Strong gamma emitter deposition
Basic case gamma depostions are showed in figures 8.10 and 8.11. Gamma emitter
deposition seems to have maximum values of circa 2 MBq/m2 for both sites. The con-
tribution of cesium is roughly 1/10 of the total depostion. 1 MBq/m2 fallout is restricted
within 20 km zone at Loviisa’s case, for Olkiluoto there are some scenarios to exceed
this distance with few kilometers.
Large case strong gamma emitter depositions are illustrated in figure 8.13 for Lovi-
isa and in figure 8.13 for Olkiluoto. At the Loviisa site, the maximum value is circa 40
MBq/m2 and at Olkiluoto it is circa 60 MBq/m2. These large fallouts stay inside the
20 km zone, but the 10 MBq/m2 deposition crosses the 20 km border in some weather
conditions.
The very large release scenario would cause a significant gamma emitter depo-
sition. Figures 8.14 and 8.15 show these depositions with maximum values of 400
MBq/m2 for Loviisa and 580 MBq/m2 for Olkiluoto site. Strong gamma emitter fallout
of 10 MBq/m2 reaches 100 km distance from the site in significantly many weather
scenarios at both sites.
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8.3 Dose rates and doses
8.3.1 Dose rates
The dose rate of interest is 100 µSv/h. Duration when this dose rate is exceeded during
the first 48 hours is significant only in very large cases. Time map for duration is
illustrated in fig. 8.16 for Loviisa and in fig. 8.17 for Olkiluoto. At the Loviisa case,
the dose rate is over 100 µSv/h for the whole simulation period at the UPZ and outside
of it, but outside the 20 km EPZ the duration stays under 6 hours. In Olkiluoto there
are several scenarios where the 48 hour duration reaches the 20 km distance and even
exceeds it with few kilometers in the direction of the city of Pori. Even though the 48
hour range is wide, otherwise the dose rate of 100 µSv/h is exceeded for 6 hours or less
outside the EPZ.
25 0 25 50 75 100 km
Case: very large
0 - 1 h
1 - 2 h
2 - 3 h
3 - 4 h
4 - 5 h
Olkiluoto NPP
5 km zone
20 km zone
Duration when strong gamma
emitter air concentration
exceeds 10 kBq/m³ during
first 48 hours
FIGURE 8.3: Time map of duration when gamma emitter air activity concentration
10 kBq/m3 is exceeded in Olkiluoto very large case.
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8.3.2 Doses
Dose calculations for 48 hour time integration interval were not significant in any of
the scenarios. Hence, the following covers only the 7 day interval results.
External and inhalation pathway dose
In the large cases external dose combined with inhalation dose for unprotected adults
during the first week are shown at Loviisa in fig. 8.18 and at Olkiluoto in fig. 8.19.
For Loviisa the first week dose remains under 6 mSv and for most scenarios the 4 mSv
threshold is not exceeded outside the emergency planning zone. For Olkiluoto the
maximum values are higher – 7-9 mSv – in the precautionary action zone and outside
of it at the coast. Outside the 20 km radius the doses can rise up to 5 mSv, but in the
most cases the dose remains under 3 mSv.
For very large case the similar dose examination for unprotected adults during the
first week is illustrated in figure 8.20 for Loviisa and in figure 8.21 for Olkiluoto. The
results show that at the Loviisa PAZ the doses can reach 60 mSv and when reaching
the 20 km zone border the doses stay under 30 mSv for most scenarios. In some sce-
narios the dose between 10-20 mSv can be exceeded in Kotka. At Olkiluoto the doses
are higher: maximum values at 80-90 mSv inside the PAZ. Between 5-20 km radii the
doses reach 40-60 mSv in most cases but outside EPZ the doses remain between 20-40
mSv. 10 mSv can be exceeded at Rauma and eastern Pori.
Dose calculations for unprotected children during the first week in large cases are
shown in figure 8.22 for Loviisa and in figure 8.23 for Olkiluoto. At Loviisa 10 mSv
doses are restricted mainly inside the PAZ. Calculations show that outside the 20 km
radius the 6 mSv is unlikely to exceed. At Olkiluoto the dose for children is higher,
being 15-20 mSv inside the PAZ and nearby areas outside of it. 10 mSv doses should
stay within the EPZ.
Doses for unprotected children in very large cases are shown in figure 8.25 for
Loviisa and in figure 8.25 for Olkiluoto. At Loviisa the maximum doses are between
100-120 mSv near the power plant. Between 5-20 km zones the doses are 40-100 mSv.
The area of 10 mSv dose spreads to eastern Porvoon, southern Kouvola and southern
Hamina outside the EPZ. 20 mSv is exceeded in the Loviisa-Pyhtää-Kotka area. At
Olkiluoto the doses are a bigger. Near the NPP the maximum values are 150-180
mSv. 50-150 mSv doses are exceeded in almost every scenario inside the 20 km zone.
The 10 mSv dose are reaches over Pori in the north, western Sastamala in the east
and southern Laitila in the south outside the EPZ and the 20 mSv stays within Pori-
Ulvila-Rauma region.
Thyroid dose
Thyroid dose during the first week for unprotected adults in large cases are illustrated
in figure 8.26 at Loviisa site and in figure 8.27 at Olkiluoto site. For Loviisa the
maximum doses are in the range of 50-60 mSv and exceed the PAZ for few kilometers.
Outside the EPZ the thyroid dose is likely to stay under 30 mSv. The doses over 20
mSv do not seem to reach Kotka at north-west direction. At Olkiluoto the maximum
thyroid doses are 80-100 mSv spred out rather similarly inside and outside the 5 km
zone as at the Loviisa site. Outside the 20 km zone the mainly stay below 40 mSv and
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the 20 mSv are reaches to southern parts of Pori in the north and western parts of
Rauma in the south.
For very large release case the adult thyroid doses during the first week are shown
in figure 8.28 for Loviisa and in figure 8.29 for Olkiluoto. Very large case shows signif-
icant doses during the first week. At Loviisa the maximum thyroid doses are 500-600
mSv and inside the 20 km zone the dose can reach 400 mSv. 100 mSv can be exceeded
east from Loviisa Kotka and Hamina. At Olkiluoto maximum dose can elevate up
to 1 Sv inside the PAZ. Nearly for every scenario the 200 mSv is exceeded outside
the EPZ. 100 mSv thyroid doses are possible from the north-western parts of Pori to
south-eastern parts of Rauma.
Thyroid doses during the first week calculated for unprotected children are shown
for Loviisa large case in figure 8.30 and for Olkiluoto large case in figure 8.31. At
Loviisa the maximum thyroid dose for children 160 mSv is about three times the max-
imum values for adults. This dose is very local and effectively the maximum value
can be considered to be circa 150 mSv. 10 mSv thyroid dose is exceeded circa 85 km
from the NPP under some weather conditions. The possible 10 mSv dose area con-
sists Kotka, Hamina and southern Kouvola. Eastern Porvoo can be affected with this
thyroid dosage as well. At Olkiluoto the maximum doses are in the range of 200-260
mSv at the coastline of south-western Eurajoki. Within the 20 km zone 100 mSv is
exceeded in almost every scenario. The possible are of having 10 mSv thyroid doses
extends to Merikarvia in the north, to western Sastamala in the east, and to Laitila in
the south. 100 km zone is not exceeded in either of the sites.
Very large cases for unprotected children’s first week’s thyroid dose are illustrated
in figure 8.32 for Loviisa and for Olkiluoto a corresponding illustration is found in the
figure 8.33. At Loviisa case the maximum doses reach circa 1.5 Sv inside and near
the PAZ. Inside the EPZ is expected to have 600-800 mSv doses. The possible 10 mSv
area expands over the 100 km zone. Helsinki and Hämeenlinna in the west, Mikkeli
in the north, and Savonlinna in the north-east are the furthest large cities possibly
affected. At Olkiluoto doses at the Eurajoki south-western coastline can reach even
2.5 Sv. Inside the EPZ 1.2 Sv doses can be expected nearly in all weather cases. The
10 mSv area can reach areas far outside the 100 km zone, even Helsinki in the south-
east, Jyväskylä in the east, Kokkola in the north (out of the range of figure 8.33), and
Turku in the south.
8.4 General observations
It can be observed that the in every case and every studied quantity the results follow
the directions indicated by the wind roses (see figures 5.2 and 5.3).
In general, the results show consistency to the magnitude of the release. Therefore,
the results can be considered feasible at this point of view. The results show continuity
in the data, so the calculation grid works as desired.
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8.5 Comparison to the VAL-guide’s dose critera and
operational intervention levels
This section compares the results of this study to the operational intervention levels
and other threshold values behind them from the VAL-guides considering protective
actions. This comparison is done simply by checking if the threshold value exceeds out-
side the 20 km zone, which is approximated to be the EPZ. The only exceptions are the
dose rate of 100 µSv/h and air concentration of strong gamma emitters being over 10
kBq/m3, which were observed as the function of the duration when these values were
exceeded. These are compared to those quantities which are an alternative measure
of protective actions or the motivation of some intervention level. Since 48 hour time
integration interval showed no significant results, the one week time interval is used
as an approximation for in which areas it is possible that the dose criteria is exceeded
within some 48 hour time frame.
Strong gamma emitter deposition after 48 hours, dose and thyroid dose for adults
and children during the first week are compared to dose criteria, and for deposition to
operational intervention level, in table 8.1. It is observed that the affected areas are
consistent case-wise for both Loviisa and Olkiluoto sites.
For the basic case none of the criteria or intervention level is exceeded. In large
case the gamma emitter deposition OIL exceeds the EPZ in some weather scenarios as
well as the thyroid dose criterion for children. External dose criterion for children ex-
ceeds within the limits of the EPZ. For adults, neither thyroid or external dose criteria
is exceeded in the large case.
For very large case all the above criteria and OILs are exceeding the EPZ. Gamma
emitter deposition OIL and thryoid dose criterion for children spreads over the 100 km
radius in some weather scenarios.
Considering duration when OILs of strong gamma emitter air concentration (10
kBq/m3) and dose rate (100 µSv/h) are exceeded, were significant only in very large
case. It is observed that the dose rate duration is much longer with maximum of 48
hours whereas the gamma emitter air concentration stays 5-6 hours or under. For
Loviisa the 48 hour area is smaller than for Olkiluoto. All the duration maps are
consistent in case of direction compared to deposition and doses.
8.5.1 Contamination levels
Considering contamination levels via fallout, results show that it is probable that ex-
tremely heavy contamination occurs both in large and very large cases for both sites.
For large case this area remains under 100 km zone but for very large case it is ex-
ceeded.
When observing the dose rate of 100 µSv/h the extremely contaminated area stays
within EPZ for the longest periods of time in the Loviisa very large case and exceeds
with few kilometers in some weather scenarios at Olkiluoto. Outside the EPZ ex-
tremely contaminated area is that for less than 6 hours, if dose rate is the observable.
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TABLE 8.1: Comparison of the results and VAL-guide dose criteria and operational
intervention levels.
Dose criterion/
OIL distance:
5-20 km: X BASIC LARGE VERY LARGE
20-100 km: XX > 100 km : XXX LO OL LO OL LO OL
Strong γ emitter deposition
(after 48 hours) ≥10 MBq/m2
sheltering indoors –
intermediate phase
–∗ –∗ XX XX XXX XXX
Dose ≥ 10 mSv, adults (week)
Sheltering indoors – early and
intermediate phases
–∗ –∗ –∗ –∗ XX XX
Dose ≥ 10 mSv, children (week)
Sheltering indoors – early and
intermediate phases
–∗ –∗ X X XX XX
Dose ≥ 20 mSv, adults (week)
evacuation – early and
intermediate phases
–∗ –∗ –∗ –∗ XX XX
Dose ≥ 20 mSv, children (week)
Evacuation – early and
intermediate phases
–∗ –∗ –∗ –∗ XX XX
Thyroid dose (week) ≥ 100 mSv,
adults
iodine prophylaxis – early phase
–∗ –∗ –∗ –∗ XX XX
Thyroid dose (week) ≥ 10 mSv,
1 y/o children
iodine prophylaxis – early phase
–∗ –∗ XX XX XXX XXX
∗Dose criterion/OIL not exceeded in the scenario.
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FIGURE 8.4: Combined 137Cs and 134Cs deposition after 48 hours in Loviisa basic
case.
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FIGURE 8.5: Combined 137Cs and 134Cs deposition after 48 hours in Olkiluoto basic
case.
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FIGURE 8.6: Combined 137Cs and 134Cs deposition after 48 hours in Loviisa large
case.
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FIGURE 8.7: Combined 137Cs and 134Cs deposition after 48 hours in Olkiluoto large
case.
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FIGURE 8.8: Combined 137Cs and 134Cs deposition after 48 hours in Loviisa very
large case.
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FIGURE 8.9: Combined 137Cs and 134Cs deposition after 48 hours in Olkiluoto very
large case.
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FIGURE 8.10: Strong gamma emitter deposition after 48 hours in Loviisa basic case.
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FIGURE 8.11: Strong gamma emitter deposition after 48 hours in Olkiluoto basic
case.
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FIGURE 8.12: Strong gamma emitter deposition after 48 hours in Loviisa large case.
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FIGURE 8.13: Strong gamma emitter deposition after 48 hours in Olkiluoto large
case.
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FIGURE 8.14: Strong gamma emitter deposition after 48 hours in Loviisa very large
case.
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FIGURE 8.15: Strong gamma emitter deposition after 48 hours in Olkiluoto very large
case.
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FIGURE 8.16: Time map of Loviisa very large case for duration when dose rate 100
µSv/h is exceeded.
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FIGURE 8.17: Time map of Olkiluoto very large case for duration when dose rate 100
µSv/h is exceeded.
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FIGURE 8.18: Dose via inhalation and external exposure for unprotected adults dur-
ing first week in Loviisa large case.
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FIGURE 8.19: Dose via inhalation and external exposure for unprotected adults dur-
ing first week in Olkiluoto large case.
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FIGURE 8.20: Dose via inhalation and external exposure for unprotected adults dur-
ing first week in Loviisa very large case.
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FIGURE 8.21: Dose via inhalation and external exposure for unprotected adults dur-
ing first week in Olkiluoto very large case.
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FIGURE 8.22: Dose via inhalation and external exposure for 1 year old unprotected
children during first week in Loviisa large case.
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FIGURE 8.23: Dose via inhalation and external exposure for 1 year old unprotected
children during first week in Olkiluoto large case.
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FIGURE 8.24: Dose via inhalation and external exposure for 1 year old unprotected
children during first week in Loviisa very large case.
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FIGURE 8.25: Dose via inhalation and external exposure for 1 year old unprotected
children during first week in Olkiluoto very large case.
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FIGURE 8.26: Thyroid dose for unprotected adults during first week in Loviisa large
case.
5 0 5 10 15 20 km
Case: large
20 - 40 mSv
40 - 60 mSv
60 - 80 mSv
80 - 100 mSv
Thyroid dose for adults
during first week
Olkiluoto NPP
5 km zone
20 km zone
FIGURE 8.27: Thyroid dose for unprotected adults during first week in Olkiluoto
large case.
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FIGURE 8.28: Thyroid dose for unprotected adults during first week in Loviisa very
large case.
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FIGURE 8.29: Thyroid dose for unprotected adults during first week in Olkiluoto very
large case.
CHAPTER 8. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 52
10 0 10 20 30 40 km
Case: large
10 - 50 mSv
50 - 100 mSv
100 - 150 mSv
150 - 160 mSv
Loviisa NPP
5 km zone
20 km zone
100 km zone
Thyroid dose for children
during first week
FIGURE 8.30: Thyroid dose for 1 year old unprotected children during first week in
Loviisa large case.
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FIGURE 8.31: Thyroid dose for 1 year old unprotected children during first week in
Olkiluoto large case.
CHAPTER 8. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 53
25 0 25 50 75 100 km
Case: very large
10 - 200 mSv
200 - 400 mSv
400 - 600 mSv
600 - 800 mSv
800 - 1000 mSv
1000 - 1200 mSv
1200 - 1400 mSv
1400 - 1600 mSv
Loviisa NPP
5 km zone
20 km zone
100 km zone
Thyroid dose for children
during first week
FIGURE 8.32: Thyroid dose for 1 year old unprotected children during first week in
Loviisa very large case.
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FIGURE 8.33: Thyroid dose for 1 year old unprotected children during first week in
Loviisa very large case.
Chapter 9
Conclusions
Based on the results of this study, the current emergency planning zones are sufficient
in most weather and release scenarios. Only the very large release scenario showed
the need for protective actions outside the EPZ with respect to several studied oper-
ational intervention levels. For these areas, further study and possibly some further
emergency planning for nuclear power plant accidents are in order. Large and basic
cases show less severe consequences. The basic case does not have nearly any signifi-
cant consequences and for the large case those stay within the 20 km zone.
Results show that some of the dose criteria and operational intervention levels are
not consistent with each other. For example, during the first 48 hours the external dose
rate exceeds the operational intervention level in the very large case for significant pe-
riods of time, but the dose criterion for sheltering is not exceeded. This stresses the
uncertainty in the dose calculations and overall evaluations in a nuclear emergency.
Consistency is shown between the strong gamma emitter deposition and the external
dose for children during the first week. At this point of view, the operational interven-
tion level serves its purpose protecting the children.
9.1 Future research
A broader dose calculations analysis would offer more intake to comparison with the
operational intervention levels. This analysis could include several other time ranges
for dose calculations, for example multiple different 48 hour slots at different phases
of the accident.
The similar analysis of this thesis can be performed to the new Finnish NPPs:
Olkiluoto 3 and Hanhikivi 1. The same method can be applied to possible analysis
on consequences of small modular reactor related accidents and to NPP sites in the
neighbouring countries. SMR and foreign NPP site analysis would require review on
the weather model areas and parameters, but otherwise the model should be directly
suitable.
For future research topics this thesis would also suggest sensitivity analysis on
choosing the weather scenarios, i.e. the effect of the chosen weather data percentile.
Another point of view is how the different seasons affect the results, should there be
different preparedness in the summer than in the winter.
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Chapter 10
Summary
The goal of this thesis was to study potential consequences of hypothetical nuclear
power plant accidents at operating Finnish reactor units in Loviisa and Olkiluoto.
Purpose was to find out how the magnitude of release affects the consequences and
are the emergency preparedness zones suitable for these releases. Operational inter-
vention levels and dose criteria for the protective actions were also compared.
Consequences were assessed using historical weather data from years 2012-2015.
Weather data was collected with AROME and HARMONIE forecast models. The
weather data acted as an input for dispersion and deposition calculations for three
release scenarios – basic, large, and very large – executed with SILAM dispersion
model. Doses and dose rates were calculated with STUK’s threat assessment tool
TIUKU. The SILAM and TIUKU outputs were post processed with Python 2.7 and its
libraries. Map products were created using QGIS.
Depositions, air concentrations, and dose rates were calculated. Based on these,
doses, effective dose and thyroid dose were calculated for unprotected adults and one
year old children with 48 hour and 7 day integration time interval from the release.
The results show that emergency planning zones are suitable for most weather and
release scenarios. Protective actions are needed outside the EPZ significantly only
in the very large case. Basic case showed practically no need of invasive protective
actions. Large release would probably require protective actions within the emergency
planning zone. Doses during first 48 hours were not significant so the consequences
were approximated with the 7 day dose.
The dispersion calculation related data was found feasible and consistent with the
weather model. This leads to conclusion that the results are reliable and can be used
for further studies and analysis on emergency preparedness planning.
Guidelines for future research for this topic could be calculating doses with several
48 hour time intervals in different phases of an emergency to determine the need for
protective actions based on dose criteria. Furthermore, a more thorough comparison
with operational intervention levels would be possible as well. Sensitivity analysis on
choosing weather scenarios and dependence of the season would be another interesting
points of view on this topic.
Similar analysis can be done to the new Finnish NPPs, Olkiluoto 3 and Hanhikivi
1. This model can be applied to accident analysis of the neighbouring country NPPs
and to EPZ assessment of small modular reactors as well with adjustments to the
weather model.
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